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CAP. 17.
Of the errors of such as have descended and applied
themselves to experience, and attempted to induce knowledge upon
particulars. That they have not had the resolution and strength of mind to
free themselves wholly from Anticipations, but have made a confusion and
intermixture of Anticipations and observations, and so vanished. That if
any have had the strength of mind generally to purge away and discharge all
Anticipations, they have not had that greater and double strength and
patience of mind, as well to repel new Anticipations after the view and
search of particulars, as to reject old which were in their mind before;
but have from particulars and history flown up to principles without the
mean degrees, and so framed all the middle generalities or axioms, not by
way of scale or ascension from particulars, but by way of derivation from
principles; whence hath issued the infinite chaos of shadows and notions,
wherewith both books and minds have been hitherto, and may be yet hereafter
much more pestered. That in the course of those derivations, to make them
yet the more unprofitable, they have used when any light of new instance
opposite to any assertion appeared, rather to reconcile the instance than
to amend the rule. That if any have had or shall have the power and
resolution to fortify and inclose his mind against all Anticipations, yet
if he have not been or shall not be cautioned by the full understanding of
the nature of the mind and spirit of man, and therein of the seats, pores
and passages both of knowledge and error, he hath not been nor shall not be
possibly able to guide or keep on his course aright. That those that have
been conversant in experience and observation have used, when they have
intended to discover the cause of any effect, to fix their consideration
narrowly and exactly upon that effect itself with all the circumstances
thereof, and to vary the trial thereof as many ways as can be devised;
which course amounteth but to a tedious curiosity, and ever breaketh off in
wondering and not in knowing; and that they have not used to enlarge their
observation to match and sort that effect with instances of a diverse
subject, which must of necessity be before any cause be found out. That
they have passed over the observation of instances vulgar and ignoble, and
stayed their attention chiefly upon instances of mark; whereas the other
sort are for the most part more significant and of better height and
information. That every particular that worketh any effect is a thing
compounded (more or less) of diverse single natures, (more manifest and
more obscure,) and that it appeareth not to whether of the natures the
effect is to be ascribed, and yet notwithstanding they have taken a course
without breaking particulars and reducing them by exclusions and inclusions
to a definite point, to conclude upon inductions in gross, which empirical
course is no less vain than the scholastical. That all such as have sought
action and work out of their inquiry have been hasty and pressing to
discover some practices for present use, and not to discover Axioms,
joining with them the new assignations as their sureties. That the
forerunning of the mind to frame recipes upon Axioms at the entrance, is
like Atalanta's golden ball that hindereth and interrupteth the course,
and is to be inhibited till you have ascended to a certain stage and degree
of generalities; which forbearance will be liberally recompensed in the
end; and that chance discovereth new inventions by one and one, but
science by knots and clusters. That they have not collected sufficient
quantity of particulars, nor them in sufficient certainty and subtilty, nor
of all several kinds, nor with those advantages and discretions in the
entry and sorting which are requisite; and of the weak manner of collecting
natural history which hath been used. Lastly that they had no knowledge of
the formulary of interpretation, the work whereof is to abridge experience
and to make things as certainly found out by Axiom in short time, as by
infinite experiences in ages.
[@ Works III, 245-7]
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