1. FRANCIS
BACON thought in this manner. The knowledge
whereof the world is now possessed, especially that of nature, extendeth
not to magnitude and certainty of works. The Physician pronounceth many
diseases incurable, and faileth oft in the rest. The Alchemists wax old and
die in hopes. The Magicians perform nothing that is permanent and
profitable. The Mechanics take small light from natural philosophy, and do
but spin on their own little threads. Chance sometimes discovereth
inventions; but that worketh not in years, but ages. So he saw well, that
the inventions known are very unperfect; and that new are not like to be
brought to light but in great length of time; and that those which are,
came not to light by philosophy. |
2. He thought also this state of knowledge was the
worse, because men strive (against themselves) to save the credit of
ignorance, and to satisfy themselves in this poverty. For the Physician,
besides his cautels of practice, hath this general cautele of art, that he
dischargeth the weakness of his art upon supposed impossibilities: neither
can his art be condemned, when itself judgeth. That philosophy also, out of
which the knowledge of physic, which now is in use, is hewed, receiveth
certain positions and opinions, which (if they be well weighed) induce this
persuasion, that no great works are to be expected from art, and the hand
of man; as in particular that opinion, that the heat, of the sun and
fire differ in kind; and that other, that Composition is the work of
man, and Mixture is the work of nature, and the like; all tending to
the circumscription of man's power, and to artificial despair; killing in
men, not only the comfort of imagination, but the industry of trial; only
upon vain glory to have their art thought perfect, and that all is
impossible that is not already found. The Alchemist dischargeth his art
upon his own errors, either supposing a misunderstanding of the words of
his authors, which maketh him listen after auricular traditions; or else a
failing in the true proportions and scruples of practice, which maketh him
renew infinitely his trials; and finding also that he lighteth upon some
mean experiments and conclusions by the way, feedeth upon them, and
magnifieth them to the most, and supplieth the rest in hopes. The Magician,
when he findeth something (as he conceiveth) above nature effected,
thinketh, when a breach is once made in nature, that it is all one to
perform great things and small; not seeing that they are but subjects of a
certain kind, wherein magic and superstition hath played in all times. The
Mechanical person, if he can refine an invention, or put two or three
observations or practices together in one, or couple things better with
their use, or make the work in less or greater volume, taketh himself for
an inventor. So he saw well, that men either persuade themselves of new
inventions as of impossibilities; or else think they are already extant,
but in secret and in few hands; or that they account of those little
industries and additions, as of inventions: all which turneth to the
averting of their minds from any just and constant labour to invent further
in any quantity. |
3. He thought also, when men did set before themselves
the variety and perfection of works produced by mechanical arts, they are
apt rather to admire the provisions of man, than to apprehend his wants;
not considering, that the original inventions and conclusions of nature
which are the life of all that variety, are not many nor deeply fetched;
and that the rest is but the subtile and ruled motion of the instrument and
hand; and that the shop therein is not unlike the library, which in such
number of books containeth (for the far greater part) nothing but
iterations, varied sometimes in form, but not new in substance. So he saw
plainly, that opinion of store was a cause of want; and that both works and
doctrines appear many and are few. 4. He thought also, that knowledge is uttered to men, in a form as if every thing were finished; for it is reduced into arts and methods, which in their divisions do seem to include all that may be. And how weakly soever the parts are filled, yet they carry the shew and reason of a total; and thereby the writing of some received authors go for the very art: whereas antiquity used to deliver the knowledge which the mind of man had gathered, in observations, aphorisms, or short and dispersed sentences, or small tractates of some parts that they had diligently meditated and laboured; which did invite men, both to ponder that which was invented, and to add and supply further. But now sciences are delivered to be believed and accepted, and not to be examined and further discovered; and the succession is between master and disciple, and not between inventor and continuer or advancer: and therefore sciences stand at a stay, and have done for many ages, and that which is positive is fixed, and that which is question is kept question, so as the columns of no further proceeding are pitched. And therefore he saw plainly, men had cut themselves off from further invention; and that it is no marvel that that is not obtained, which hath not been attempted, but rather shut out and debarred. |
5. He thought also, that knowledge is almost generally
sought either for delight and satisfaction, or for gain and profession, or
for credit and ornament, and that every of these are as Atalanta's balls,
which hinder the race of invention. For men are so far in these courses
from seeking to increase the mass of knowledge, as of that mass which is
they will take no more than will serve their turn: and if any one amongst
so many seeketh knowledge for itself, yet he rather seeketh to know the
variety of things, than to discern of the truth and causes of them; and if
his inquisition be yet more severe, yet it tendeth rather to judgment than
to invention; and rather to discover truth in controversy, than new matter;
and if his heart be so large as he propoundeth to himself further discovery
or invention, yet it is rather of new discourse and speculation of causes,
than of effects and operations: and as for those that have so much in their
mouths, action and use and practice and the referring of sciences
thereunto, they mean it of application of that which is known, and not of a
discovery of that which is unknown. So he saw plainly, that this mark,
namely invention of further means to endow the condition and life of man
with new powers or works, was almost never yet set up and resolved in man's
intention and inquiry. 6. He thought also, that, amongst other knowledges, natural philosophy hath been the least followed and laboured. For since the Christian faith, the greatest number of wits have been employed, and the greatest helps and rewards have been converted upon divinity. And before time likewise, the greatest part of the studies of philosophers was consumed in moral philosophy, which was as the heathen divinity. And in both times a great part of the best wits betook themselves to law, pleadings, and causes of estate; specially in the time of the greatness of the Romans, who by reason of their large empire needed the service of all their able men for civil business. And the time amongst the Grecians in which natural philosophy seemed most to flourish, was but a short space; and that also rather abused in differing sects and conflicts of opinions, than profitably spent: since which time, natural philosophy was never any profession, nor never possessed any whole man, except perchance some monk in a cloister, or some gentleman in the country, and that very rarely; but became a science of passage, to season a little young and unripe wits, and to serve for an introduction to other arts, specially physic and the practical mathematics. So as he saw plainly, that natural philosophy hath been intended by few persons, and in them hath occupied the least part of their time, and that in the weakest of their age and judgment. |
7. He thought also, how great opposition and prejudice
natural philosophy had received by superstition, and the immoderate and
blind zeal of religion; for he found that some of the Grecians which first
gave the reason of thunder, had been condemned of impiety; and that the
cosmographers which first discovered and described the roundness of the
earth, and the consequence thereof touching the Antipodes, were not much
otherwise censured by the ancient fathers of the Christian Church; and that
the case is now much worse, in regard of the boldness of the schoolmen and
their dependances in the monasteries, who having made divinity into an art,
have almost incorporated the contentious philosophy of Aristotle into the
body of Christian religion. And generally he perceived in men of devout
simplicity, this opinion, that the secrets of nature were the secrets of
God and part of that glory whereinto the mind of man if it seek to press
shall be oppressed; and that the desire in men to attain to so great and
hidden knowledge, bath a resemblance with that temptation which caused the
original fall: and on the other side in men of a devout policy, he noted an
inclination to have the people depend upon God the more, when they are less
acquainted with second causes; and to have no stirring in philosophy, lest
it may lead to an innovation in divinity, or else should discover matter of
further contradiction to divinity. But in this part resorting to the
authority of the Scriptures, and holy examples, and to reason, he rested
not satisfied alone, but much confirmed. For first he considered that the
knowledge of nature, by the light whereof man discerned of every living
creature, and imposed names according to their propriety, was not the
occasion of the fall; but the moral knowledge of good and evil, affected to
the end to depend no more upon God's commandments, but for man to direct
himself; neither could he find in any Scripture, that the inquiry and
science of man in any thing, under the mysteries of the Deity, is
determined and restrained, but contrariwise allowed and provoked; for
concerning all other knowledge the Scripture pronounceth, That it is the
glory of God to conceal, but it is the glory of man (or of the
king, for the king is but the excellency of man) to invent; and
again, The spirit of man is as the lamp of God, wherewith he searcheth
every secret; and again most effectually, That God hath made all
things beautiful and decent, according to the return of their seasons; also
that he hath set the world in man's heart, and yet man cannot find out the
work which God worketh from the beginning to the end; shewing that the
heart of man is a continent of that concave or capacity, wherein the
content of the world (that is, all forms of the creatures and whatsoever is
not God) may be placed or received; and complaining that through the
variety of things and vicissitudes of times (which are but impediments and
not impuissances) man cannot accomplish his invention. In precedent also he
set before his eyes, that in those few memorials before the flood, the
Scripture honoureth the name of the inventors of music and works in metal;
that Moses had this addition of praise, that he was seen in all the
learning of the Egyptians; that Solomon, in his grant of wisdom from God,
had contained as a branch thereof, that knowledge whereby he wrote a
natural history of all verdor, from the cedar to the moss, and of all that
breatheth; that the book of Job, and many places of the prophets, have
great aspersion of natural philosophy; that the Church in the bosom and lap
thereof, in the greatest injuries of times, ever preserved (as holy relics)
the books of philosophy and all heathen learning; and that when Gregory the
bishop of Rome became adverse and unjust to the memory of heathen
antiquity, it was censured for pusillanimity in him, and the honour thereof
soon after restored, and his own memory almost persecuted by his successor
Sabinian; and lastly in our times and the ages of our fathers, when Luther
and the divines of the Protestant Church on the one side, and the Jesuits
on the other, have enterprised to reform, the one the doctrine, the other
the discipline and manners of the Church of Rome, he saw well how both of
them have awaked to their great honour and succour all human learning. And
for reason, there cannot be a greater and more evident than this; that all
knowledge and specially that of natural philosophy tendeth highly to the
magnifying of the glory of God in his power, providence, and benefits;
appearing and engraven in his works, which without this knowledge are
beheld but as through a veil; for if the heavens in the body of them do
declare the glory of God to the eye, much more do they in the rule and
decrees of them declare it to the understanding. And another reason not
inferior to this is, that the same natural philosophy principally amongst
all other human knowledge doth give an excellent defence against both
extremes of religion, superstition and infidelity; for both it freeth the
mind from a number of weak fancies and imaginations, and it raiseth the
mind to acknowledge that to God all things are possible: for to that
purpose speaketh our Saviour in that first canon against heresies delivered
upon the case of the resurrection, You err, not knowing the Scriptures,
nor the power of God; teaching that there are but two fountains of
heresy, not knowing the will of God revealed in the Scriptures, and not
knowing the power of God revealed or at least made most sensible in his
creatures. So as he saw well, that natural philosophy was of excellent use
to the exaltation of the Divine Majesty; and that which is admirable, that
being a remedy of superstition, it is nevertheless an help to faith. He saw
likewise, that the former opinions to the prejudice thereof had no true
ground; but must spring either out of mere ignorance, or out of an excess
of devotion, to have divinity all in all, whereas it should be only above
all (both which states of mind may be best pardoned); or else out of worse
causes, namely out of envy, which is proud weakness and deserveth to be
despised; or out of some mixture of imposture, to tell a lie for God's
cause; or out of an impious diffidence, as if men should fear to discover
some things in nature which might subvert faith. But still he saw well,
howsoever these opinions are in right reason reproved, yet they leave not
to be most effectual hindrances to natural philosophy and invention. |
8. He thought also, that there wanted not great
contrariety to the further discovery of sciences, in regard of the orders
and customs of universities, and also in regard of common opinion. For in
universities and colleges men's studies are almost confined to certain
authors, from which if any dissenteth or propoundeth matter of redargution,
it is enough to make him thought a person turbulent; whereas if it be well
advised, there is a great difference to be made between matters
contemplative and active. For in government change is suspected, though to
the better; but it is natural to arts to be in perpetual agitation and
growth; neither is the danger alike of new light, and of new motion or
remove. And for vulgar and received opinions, nothing is more usual nor
more usually complained of, than that it is imposed for arrogancy and
presumption for men to authorise themselves against antiquity and authors,
towards whom envy is ceased, and reverence by time amortised; it not being
considered what Aristotle himself did (upon whom the philosophy that now is
chiefly dependeth); who came with a professed contradiction to all the
world, and did put all his opinions upon his own authority and argument,
and never so much as nameth an author but to confute and reprove him; and
yet his success well fulfilled the observation of Him that said, If a man
come in his own name, him will you receive. Men think likewise, that if
they should give themselves to the liberty of invention and travail of
inquiry, that they shall light again upon some conceits and contemplations
which have been formerly offered to the world, and have been put down by
better, which have prevailed and brought them to oblivion; not seeing that
howsoever the property and breeding of knowledges is in great and excellent
wits, yet the estimation and price of them is in the multitude, or in the
inclinations of princes and great persons meanly learned. So as those
knowledges are like to be received and honoured, which have their
foundation in the subtility or finest trial of common sense, or such as
fill the imagination; and not such knowledge as is digged out of the hard
mine of history and experience, and falleth out to be in some points as
adverse to common sense or popular reason, as religion, or more. Which kind
of knowledge, except it be delivered with strange advantages of eloquence
and power, may be likely to appear and disclose a little to the world and
straight to vanish and shut again. So that time seemeth to be of the
nature of a river or flood, that bringeth down to us that which is light
and blown up, and sinketh and drowneth that which is solid and grave. So he
saw well, that both in the state of religion, and in the administration of
learning, and in common opinion, there were many and continual stops and
traverses to the course of invention. 9. He thought also, that the invention of works and further possibility was prejudiced in a more special manner than that of speculative truth; for besides the impediments common to both, it hath by itself been notably hurt and discredited by the vain promises and pretences of Alchemy, Magic, Astrology, and such other arts, which (as they now pass) hold much more of imagination and belief than of sense and demonstration. But to use the poets' language, men ought to have remembered that although Ixion of a cloud in the likeness of Juno begat Centaurs and Chimaeras, yet Jupiter also of the true Juno begat Vulcan and Hebe. Neither is it just to deny credit to the greatness of the acts of Alexander, because the like or more strange have been feigned of an Amadis or an Arthur, or other fabulous worthies. But though this in true reason should be, and that men ought not to make a confusion of unbelief; yet he saw well it could not otherwise be in event, but that experience of untruth had made access to truth more difficult, and that the ignominy of vanity had abated all greatness of mind. |
10. He thought also, there was found in the mind of man
an affection naturally bred, and fortified and furthered by discourse and
doctrine, which did pervert the true proceeding towards active and
operative knowledge. This was a false estimation, that it should be as a
diminution to the mind of man to be much conversant in experiences and
particulars subject to sense and bound in matter, and which are laborious
to search, ignoble to meditate, harsh to deliver, illiberal to practise,
infinite as is supposed in number, and no ways accommodate to the glory of
arts. This opinion or state of mind received much credit and strength by
the school of Plato, who thinking that particulars rather revived the
notions or excited the faculties of the mind, than merely informed; and
having mingled his philosophy with superstition, which never favoureth the
sense; extolleth too much the understanding of man in the inward light
thereof. And again Aristotle's school, which giveth the due to the sense in
assertion, denieth it in practice much more than that of Plato. For we see
the schoolmen, Aristotle's succession, which were utterly ignorant of
history, rested only upon agitation of wit; whereas Plato giveth good
example of inquiry by induction and view of particulars; though in such a
wandering manner as is of no force or fruit. So that he saw well, that the
supposition of the sufficiency of man's mind hath lost the means
thereof. [@ Works III, 496-504] |