(Last update with added links: April 23, 2020)


    The U.S. Constitution as well as virtually all state constitutions contain provisions condemning the unequal application of the law. For example, the 14th Amendment prohibits the states from denying “to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” Here in Bama, the combination of Art. 1, §§1 and 35 of our Constitution likewise prevents such unequal application of the law. But, what precisely is “equal protection of the laws”? One may learn about this legal principle only by diligent study of the relevant cases which define this term and apply it to specific facts and circumstances.

    I know that on the Net certain factions and groups make disparaging comments and remarks about that “bad, evil case law” which to them only proves that lawyers are conspiring against the people. If it is so bad to be publishing case law and having the principle of “stare decisis” applied, then let's just throw it out. When you do so, you will find that many of your rights will vanish at the same time. The “common law” advocates whine against case law without understanding that much of the common law IS case law. Virtually all common law crimes were developed via case law; most of tort law (personal injury) was case developed, and your rights to real and personal property have their origins with cases. Many of the “right to travel” folks complain against that evil “case law” without understanding that this right exists today because of case law.

    Over the last 150 years, courts of this nation have determined and laid out certain equal protection principles. But one must also notice that there is nothing in the U.S. Constitution which prevents the federal government from applying the law unequally. Long ago, this problem was litigated by certain obviously sharp litigants; they argued that principles of due process worked almost identically with equal protection principles. Such arguments caused the U.S. Supreme Court to conclude that due process includes an “equal protection component,” and such decisions thus made equal protection principles applicable to the feds. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976); and San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. U.S. Olympic Committee, 483 U.S. 522, 542 n. 21 (1987).

    If you have read any of the other files on this site, you have probably learned that I have a great interest in cataloging cases. This is just simply the way I work. I have many files with a variety of names. Whenever I engage in legal research and run across a case I want to catalog, I note it and then place the cite and short summary of the case in the relevant file. When I am writing a brief on that topic, all I have to do is pull up that file, copy the case cites and dump them into the brief. The below is one such file. Please note that my abbreviation “EP” means equal protection.

     I invite you to learn about equal protection principles, which are important. You really should, at the least, read the cases decided by the Supremes, which I have linked to FindLaw.

Equal Protection Cases


A. Supreme Court:

F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Comm. of Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920): Tax law distinguished between corps in and out of state; violated EP.

Skinner v. State of Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942): Law re sterilization of criminals void.

Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964): Naturalized citizen married but later returned to homeland; law denying citizenship to those who lived in native land for 3 years held void.

Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965): Texas Const. did not allow servicemen stationed in Texas to vote; held EP violated as law was overbroad.

Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111 (1966):

“Equal protection does not require that all persons be dealt with identically, but it does require that a distinction made have some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made.”
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966): Right to vote predicated on $1.50 poll tax violated EP.

Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966): Rinaldi was convicted, in jail and appealed. NJ state law obligated only those in his circumstance to pay for transcript costs; held violative of EP:

 308: “Instead, the law fastens the duty of repayment only upon a single class of unsuccessful appellants – those who are confined in institutions. We find that the discriminatory classification imposed by this law violates the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause.

 309: “But the Equal Protection Clause does require that, in defining a class subject to legislation, the distinctions that are drawn have ‘some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made.’”

 310: “Finally, the classification established by the statute cannot be justified on the ground of administrative convenience.”

Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967): Miscegenation law (marriage between races) held violative of EP: “Marriage is one of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival.”

Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968): Law denied unwed mother wrongful death claim for child; law violated EP.

Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969): Denial of welfare benefits to those residing in state less than a year was EP violation.

Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969): Statute re voting limited it to those holding property within school district; held violative of EP and used compelling interest test: “In other words, the classifications must be tailored so that the exclusion of appellant and members of his class is necessary to achieve the articulated state goal.”

Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971): EP clause denies “to states the power to legislate that different treatment be accorded persons placed by a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of the statute. A classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.”

Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972): Law denying contraceptives to singles but not married violated EP; law riddled with exceptions.

Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972): Law which denied unmarried father custody of kids after mother’s death violated EP.

Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972): Workmen’s comp law denied illegitimates equal recovery rights and violated EP.

Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972): Law allowing incompetent defendant to be committed pre-trial “until sane” violated EP.

James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972): Law allowing recovery of defense costs from indigents violated EP by depriving them of protective exemptions available to other civil judgment debtors.

Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973): Denial of female air force officer quartering allowance when males were given such violated EP.

U.S. Dep't. of Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973): Food stamp act made distinction between homes with related members and those without; held violative of EP.

Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 637 (1974): Classification of bastards in welfare law violated EP (overinclusive and underinclusive). Welfare law made distinction between certain illegitimates, and certain of these were denied benefits; held violative of EP:

“Indeed, as we have noted, those illegitimates statutorily deemed dependent are entitled to benefits regardless of whether they were living in, or had ever lived in, a dependent family setting with their disabled parent. Even if children might rationally be classified on the basis of whether they are dependent upon their disabled parent, the Act's definition of these two subclasses of illegitimates is ‘over-inclusive’ in that it benefits some children who are legitimated, or entitled to inherit, or illegitimate solely because of a defect in the marriage of their parents, but who are not dependent on their disabled parent. Conversely, the Act is ‘underinclusive’ in that it conclusively excludes some illegitimates in appellants’ subclass who are, in fact, dependent upon their disabled parent. Thus, for all that is shown in this record, the two subclasses of illegitimates stand on equal footing, and the potential for spurious claims is the same as to both; hence to conclusively deny one subclass benefits presumptively available to the other denies the former the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the due process provision of the Fifth Amendment.”
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975): Gender based SSN benefits law was void.

Craig v. Bowen, 429 U.S. 190 (1976): Law distinguished between ages and sexes regarding who could buy beer; held violative of EP.

Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979): Exemption precluding women from paying alimony violated EP.

Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979): NY law distinguished between unwed mother and father; held violative of EP as overbroad.

Wengler v. Druggist Mutual Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980): Workmen’s comp law violated EP by denying widower benefits as a result of wife’s work related death.

Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982): Alaska’s tax refund arising from large oil revenues distinguished between those living in state before 1959 and those not; held violative of EP.

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982): Illegal Mexican children denied schooling via Texas law; held violative of EP.

City of Cleburne, Texas v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432 (1985): Mental retards home zoning ordinance violated EP.

Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 500 U.S. 614 (1991): Batson challenges apply to civil litigants.

Simon & Schuster v. New York Crime Victims Board, 502 U.S. 105 (1991): Son of Sam law which took book proceeds; law was overinclusive.

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996): Colorado amendment which was anti-queer violated EP.

    First Amendment cases:

Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971): Ordinance prohibited 3 or more people from assembling on sidewalk to annoy passersby; held violative of EP.

Police Department of City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972): Ordinance prohibiting school picketing was void; see also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972): picketing within 100 feet of school.

Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975): Drive-in and nudity ordinance; 214: “the legislative classification is strikingly under inclusive”.

Cary v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980): Statute prohibiting picketing of mayor’s house held void.

Dills v. City of Marietta, 674 F.2d 1377 (11th Cir. 1982): Sign ordinance held overinclusive.

Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1990): Nude dancing case.

Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935 (9th Cir. 1997): Curfew case.

B. Lower Federal courts:

James v. Director of Motor Vehicles, 336 F.2d 745 (D.C.Cir. 1964): Can’t revoke license because “morally unfit”.

Foster v. Mobile County Hospital Board, 398 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1968): Denial of black doctors to join staff held void.

O‘Day v. George Arakelian Farms, Inc., 536 F.2d 856 (9th Cir. 1976): Requiring double bond for appeal violated EP.

Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. City of Mesquite, 630 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1980): Coin operated amusement games requiring kids to be with adults (1st amend case); rev. other grounds, 455 U.S. 283 (1982).

United States v. State of South Dakota, 636 F.2d 241 (8th Cir. 1980): Case involving prohibition re unorganized county residents running for office.

Benham v. Edwards, 678 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1982): Ga. procedures re involuntary commitments challenged vis a vis criminal acquittees; held violated EP.

United States v. Brown, 817 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1987): Batson case.

Mahone v. Addicks Utility District of Harris County, 836 F.2d 921, 933 (5th Cir. 1988): Great for connecting purpose and rationale.

 “An equal protection challenge, therefore, focuses on three separate elements. First, the classification. Second, the purpose which the classification is designed to serve. And third, the ‘fit’ between the classification and the purpose; that is, whether the state could rationally determine that by distinguishing among persons as it has, the state could accomplish its legitimate purpose.”
Alegria v. United States, 945 F.2d 1523 (11th Cir. 1991): Non-resident alien who was excluded from challenging jeopardy assessment allowed to do so.

Beach Communications, Inc. v. Federal Communications Comm., 965 F.2d 1103 (D.C.Cir. 1992): distinction in Cable Act “between external, quasi-private” systems and “wholly private” violated EP; held statute was overinclusive.

C. State Cases:


McLendon v. State, 179 Ala. 54, 60 So. 392 (1912): exemption of Confederate soldiers from tax; violated EP.

Lee v. Renfro, 257 Ala. 679, 60 So.2d 849 (1952): standardless revocation of barber’s license.

Comer v. City of Mobile, 337 So.2d 742 (Ala. 1976): ethics law applying to cities over 15,000 violates EP.

Norris v. Seibels, 353 So.2d 1165, 1168 (Ala. 1977): rational basis test used.

Peddycoart v. City of Birmingham, 354 So.2d 808 (Ala. 1978): municipal immunity for torts violated EP.

City of Graysville v. Swann, 388 So.2d 540 (Ala. 1980): arbitrary class re exempts in booze law; see also Harrison v. Buckhalt, 364 So.2d 283 (Ala. 1978).

City of Birmingham v. Stegall Co., Inc., 439 So.2d 91, 94 (Ala. 1983): license law made invalid distinctions re air conditioning and heating contractors.

Crandall v. City of Birmingham, 442 So.2d 77, 78 (Ala. 1983): statute of limitations on claims against city held violative (14th amend): “Rather, the Equal Protection Clause is offended only if the state’s classification ‘rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective.’”

Merton v. State, 500 So.2d 1301 (Ala.Cr.App. 1986): rape statute unconstitutionally gender based (marital exemption).

Babcooke v. Duncan, 486 So.2d 431 (Ala. 1986): notaries available only to citizens; violated EP.

Chandler v. Hospital Authority of City of Huntsville, 500 So.2d 1012, 1015 (Ala. 1986): immunity of hospital: state & 14th amendment claims.

 “Should a legislative classification burden the exercise of a fundamental right ... heightened judicial scrutiny is required and the ‘strict scrutiny’ test will apply.”
Otherwise, only rational basis test.

Matter of Anonymous, 531 So.2d 895 (Ala.Civ.App. 1988): 14th amendment & rational basis (abortion and parental consent).

Town of Eclectic v. Mays, 547 So.2d 96, 106 (Ala. 1989): substantial relationship to law.

Barbour County Comm. v. Employees of Barbour Co. Sheriff's Dept., 566 So.2d 493, 497 (Ala. 1990):

 Legislative classes “(1) must be germane to the purpose of the law; (2) must bring within its influence all who are under the same conditions and apply equally to each person or member of the class, or each person or member who may become one of such class; (3) must not be so restricted and made to rest upon existing circumstances only as not to include proper additions to the number included within the class; (4) must be based on substantial distinctions which make one class different from another; and (5) must be reasonable under the facts of the case, and not oppressive and prohibitive.”
Gaines v. Huntsville-Madison County Airport Authority, 581 So.2d 444 (Ala. 1991): immunity violates EP.

Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Assoc., 592 So.2d 156, 165-66 (Ala. 1991): Ala const.

 “The guarantee of equal protection prohibits ‘class legislation arbitrarily discriminatory against some and favoring others in like circumstances.’

 “However, the legislature may, in the exercise of its police power, create reasonable classifications in order to eradicate or ameliorate what it perceives to be a social evil... In reviewing the constitutionality of such legislation, the sole function of the judiciary is to determine whether, in the exercise of the police power, the legislature has ‘unreasonably’ encroached upon ‘private rights’ vouchsafed to the people of this state by the Constitution.

 To determine whether legislative classes “represent a reasonable exercise of legislative power depends on whether they are reasonably related to the stated objective, and on whether the benefit sought to be bestowed upon society outweighs the detriment to private rights occasioned by the statute.”

Smith v. Schulte, 671 So.2d 1334, 1337-38 (Ala. 1995): caps on malpractice claims:
 “The Alabama Constitution allows the legislature to classify citizens in order to effect some ‘public interest’... only insofar as the resultant burden on individual rights or liberties does not outweigh the benefits effected by the statute.”
Edwards v. Moore, 699 So.2d 220, 222 (Ala.Civ.App. 1997): seduction statute was discriminatorily gender based because it didn’t “bear a substantial relationship to any important governmental objective.”


Ragland v. Forsythe, 282 Ark. 43, 666 S.W.2d 680 (1984): juke boxes and non-residents.


Ex parte Hines (1917) 33 C.A. 45, 164 P. 339: ordinance made distinction between those in and outside city; held violative of EP, essentially protective tariff.

Ex parte Hart (1918) 36 C.A. 627, 172 P. 610: another case like Hines; same conclusion.

Ex parte Robinson (1924) 68 C.A. 744, 230 P. 175: license ordinance making distinction between those in city and out held void.

Franchise Motor Freight Ass'n. v. Seavey (1925) 196 Cal. 77, 235 P. 1000: law made distinction between those hauling farm implements exclusively and others; held class was void. At 1002: “It is equally well settled that a statute makes an improper and unlawful discrimination if it confers particular privileges upon a class arbitrarily selected from a larger number of persons, all of whom stand in the same relation to the privileges granted, and between whom and the persons not so favored no reasonable distinction or substantial difference can be found justifying the inclusion of the one and the exclusion of the other.”

People v. Sackett (1935) 6 Cal.App.2d Supp. 763, 43 P.2d 1115: void law.

People v. Osborne (1936) 17 Cal.App.2d Supp. 771, 59 P.2d 1083: barbers.

Bueneman v. City of Santa Barbara (1937) 8 Cal.2d 405, 65 P.2d 884: class involved laundries, those within city and out; like above cases (summarizes many cases).

Accounting Corp. of America v. State Board of Accountancy (1949) 34 Cal.2d 186, 208 P.2d 984.

Purdy v. Fitzpatrick (1969) 71 Cal.2d 566, 456 P.2d 645: statute prohibiting employment of aliens on public works project violated EP. At 654: “Moreover, the state may not arbitrarily foreclose to any person the right to pursue an otherwise lawful occupation.”

Serrano v. Priest (1971) 96 Cal.Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241: wealth.

People v. Rappard (1972) 104 Cal.Rptr. 535, 28 C.A.3d 302: aliens.

Brown v. Merlo (1973) 8 Cal.3d 855, 506 P.2d 212, 227: Cal guest statute was overinclusive, had many exceptions and thus violated EP: “imposes a burden upon a wider range of individuals than are included in the class of those tainted with the mischief at which the law aims.”

Thompson v. Mellon (1973) 107 Cal.Rptr. 20, 507 P.2d 628: durational requirement for city office.

Cossack v. City of Los Angeles (1974) 114 Cal.Rptr. 460, 523 P.2d 260: pinball machines and games of chance.

Payne v. Superior Court of L.A. County (1976) 17 Cal.3d 908, 132 Cal.Rptr. 405, 553 P.2d 565.

Power Tool & Supply Co. v. Lakeside Chevrolet Co. (App. 2 Dist. 1984) 201 Cal.Rptr. 702, 154 Cal.App. 3d 947: void law.

Elyslum Institute, Inc. v. County of LA (App. 2 Dist. 1991) 283 Cal.Rptr. 688, 232 Cal.App. 3d 408: nudists.

County of LA v. Patrick (App. 2 Dist. 1992) 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 665, 11 Cal.App.4th 1246: strict scrutiny test.

Graham v. Kirkwood Meadows Public Utilities Dist. (App. 3 Dist. 1994) 26 Cal.Rptr.2d 798, 21 Cal.App.4th 1631.

People v. Applin (App. 5 Dist. 1995) 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 862, 40 Cal. App.4th 404.

People v. Bell (App. 4 Dist. 1996) 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 156, 45 Cal.App.4th 1080: EP defined.

In re Evans (App. 4 Dist. 1996) 57 Cal.Rptr.2d 314, 49 Cal.App.4th 1263: possession of guns by those convicted of misdemeanors; held that distinguishing date where some got benefits and others were denied benefits violated EP.


People v. Sprengel, 176 Colo. 277, 490 P.2d 65 (1971): hotels and motels.

Bird v. City of Colorado Springs, 507 P.2d 1099 (Colo. 1973): durational requirement for city office.

People v. Taylor, 189 Colo. 202, 540 P.2d 320 (1975): barbers.

City and County of Denver v. Nielson, 194 Colo. 407, 572 P.2d 484 (1977): massage ordinance violated EP.


Page v. Welfare Comm., 170 Conn. 258, 365 A.2d 1118 (1976): welfare regs violated EP.


Fla. Const., Art. 1, §2: “Basic rights.-- All natural persons, female and male alike, are equal before the law and have inalienable rights, among which are the right to enjoy and defend life and liberty....”
History of EP: Sasso v. Ram Property Mgt., 431 So.2d 204, 212-217 (Fla.App. 1 Dist. 1983).

Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Simon, 56 Fla. 545, 47 So. 1001 (1908): law imposed duty on some RR operators but exempted other common carriers; held violated EP.

State v. Blackburn, 104 So.2d 19 (Fla. 1958): law applied only to advertising signs of gas stations and not others; held violated EP.

Gammon v. Cobb, 335 So.2d 261 (Fla. 1976): unreasonable classification of illegitimate children.

Rollins v. State, 354 So.2d 61 (Fla. 1978): law re billiard halls and bowling alleys violated EP.

Dept. of Revenue v. Amrep Corp., 358 So.2d 1343 (Fla. 1978): tax statute discriminated against non-resident corp. with state subsids.

State v. Lee, 356 So.2d 276, 279 (Fla. 1978): “Good Drivers Incentive” act found violative of EP:

“The classic criterion for assessing the validity of a statutory classification is whether that classification rests upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.”
Bass v. General Development Corp., 374 So.2d 479 (Fla. 1979): agricultural lands taxed as non-agricultural; held violative of EP.


Geele v. State, 202 Ga. 381, 43 S.E.2d 254 (1947): hotels charging 2 bux a day required to install fire escapes; held violative of EP.

Jenkins v. Manry, 216 Ga. 538, 118 S.E.2d 91 (1961): distinction re plumbers invalid.

Daniel v. Cruz, 268 S.C. 11, 231 S.E.2d 293 (1977): unequal application of law re fortune tellers; no rational basis.


People v. Lindner, 127 Ill.2d 174, 535 N.E.2d 829, 833 (1989): illegal to revoke license for sex offenses:

 “Keeping off the roads drivers who have committed offenses not involving vehicles is not a reasonable means of ensuring that the roads are free of drivers who operate vehicles unsafely or illegally. To the contrary, the means chosen are arbitrary ... because the offenses ... have no connection to motor vehicles.”
People v. Lawrence, 206 Ill.App.3d 622, 565 N.E.2d 322, 323 (1990): followed Lindner, except this was drug conviction:
 “To prohibit persons from driving merely because they have committed an offense which did not even involve the use of a motor vehicle is not a reasonable way to insure that motor vehicles will be owned and operated safely and legally.”

Sturrup v. Mahan, 261 Ind. 463, 305 N.E.2d 877, 881 (1974): football anti-recruiting rule found void (like Sullivan in Texas):

“However, said bylaws are unreasonable in that they sweep too broadly in their proscription and, hence, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment... This is precisely where the rules sweep to broadly, they create an over-inclusive class...”

Pavone v. Louisiana State Bd. of Barber Examiners, 364 F.Supp. 961 (E.D.La. 1973): barber case.


Maryland State Bd. of Barber Examiners v. Kuhn, 270 Md. 496, 312 A.2d 216 (1973): barber case.


Grassman v. Minn. Bd. of Barber Examiners, 304 N.W.2d 909 (Minn. 1981): limit on apprentice barbers violates EP.


Tipco Corp., Inc. v. City of Billings, 642 P.2d 1074 (Mon. 1982): law re door to door sales violated EP.

White v. State, 661 P.2d 1272 (Mon. 1983): damage limits violates EP.


State v. Michalski, 221 Neb. 380, 377 N.W.2d 510, 515-16 (1985):

“An overinclusive classification burdens a wider than necessary range of individuals, extending beyond those persons possessing the trait contributing to the mischief or evil the legislature seeks to eradicate... An underinclusive classification exists when all persons in the class are indeed perpetrators of the mischief or evil the state wishes to eliminate, but others who possess the same undesirable trait remain outside the class.”


State ex rel Quisor v. Ellis, 181 Or. 615, 184 P.2d 860 (1947): barbers.


(based upon Art. I, §8, and Art. XI, §8 of Const)

Consumers Gasoline Stations v. City of Pulaski, 200 Tenn. 480, 292 S.W.2d 735 (1956): ordinance restricting number of gas stations in city, allowing some but not others; violated EP.

Mitchell v. Mitchell, 594 S.W.2d 699 (Tenn. 1980): gender based divorce laws violated EP.

Tenn. Dep't. of Human Service v. Vaughn, 595 S.W.2d 62 (Tenn. 1980): laws making exemption for alleged fathers in bastardy cases violated EP (gender based).

Vineyard v. Hood, 930 S.W.2d 575 (Tenn.App. 1996): gender based paternity statute violated EP.


Bolton v. Texas Bd. of Barber Examiners, 350 F.Supp. 494 (N.D.Texas 1972): barbers.

Bell v. Lone Oak Independent School District, 507 S.W.2d 636 (Tex.Civ.App.–Texarkana 1974): regulation preventing married high school students from participating in extra-curricular activities violated EP; good concurrence re inclusive.

Sullivan v. Univ. Interscholastic League, 616 S.W.2d 170, 172 (Tex. 1981): student athlete transfer rule violated EP.

 “The transfer rule infringes on his fundamental right to interstate travel.”

 “The general rule is that when the classification created by the state regulatory scheme neither infringes fundamental rights or interests nor burdens an inherently suspect class, equal protection analysis requires that the classification be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”

Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc. v. Comm. of Insurance, 626 S.W.2d 822, 830 (TexCiv.App.–Austin 1982): distinction between corp and non-corp HMOs violated EP:
 “So long as there is a substantial basis for the classification, it is not unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious and the legislature acts within the legislative scope of its authority and within the constitution... In order for a statute to be valid, all persons or things within a particular class, a sub-class, or persons similarly situated, must be affected alike by the statute or the different treatment must be justified upon some reasonable basis.”
Whitworth v. Bynum, 699 S.W.2d 194, 197 (Tex. 1985): Texas guest statute violated EP.
 “Even when the purpose of a statute is legitimate, equal protection analysis still requires a determination that the classifications drawn by the statute are rationally related to the statute's purpose [cite omitted]. Under the rational basis test of Sullivan,  similarly situated individuals must be treated equally under the statutory classification unless there is a rational basis for not doing so. Although Bynum has argued that an overinclusive statute cannot be struck down under a rational relationship test, overinclusiveness was a determinative factor in Sullivan.”
Based on Art. 1, §3 of the Const. Overinclusive statute can be struck.

Texas Educ. Agency v. Leeper, 843 S.W.2d 41 (Tex.Civ.App.–Forth Worth 1991): home schooling case, challenge to compulsory attendance law; held violative of EP because of exceptions.

H.L. Farm Corp. v. Self, 877 S.W.2d 288 (Tex. 1994): preventing “open lands” designation for corp with non-resident alien stockholder violated EP.


Leetham v. McGinn, 524 P.2d 323 (Utah 1974): barber.


Darrin v. Gould, 85 Wash. 2d 859, 540 P.2d 882 (1975). The case involved a claim of illegal discrimination against girls in the field of high school interscholastic football competition. 

Law Review Articles:

Joseph Tussman and Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 341 (1949).

82 Harv.L.Rev. 1065: Developments in the law: equal protection.